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Abstract
We study the complexity of Destructive Shift Bribery. In this problem, we are
given an election with a set of candidates and a set of voters (each ranking the candidates
from the best to the worst), a despised candidate d, a budget B, and prices for shifting d
back in the voters’ rankings. The goal is to ensure that d is not a winner of the election.
We show that this problem is polynomial-time solvable for scoring protocols (encoded
in unary), the Bucklin and Simplified Bucklin rules, and the Maximin rule, but is NP-
hard for the Copeland rule. This stands in contrast to the results for the constructive
setting (known from the literature), for which the problem is polynomial-time solvable
for k-Approval family of rules, but is NP-hard for the Borda, Copeland, and Maximin
rules. We complement the analysis of the Copeland rule showing W-hardness for the
parameterization by the budget value, and by the number of affected voters. We prove
that the problem is W-hard when parameterized by the number of voters even for unit
prices. From the positive perspective we provide an efficient algorithm for solving the
problem parameterized by the combined parameter the number of candidates and the
maximum bribery price (alternatively the number of different bribery prices).
1 Introduction
We study the complexity of the destructive variant of the Shift Bribery problem. We
consider the family of all (unary encoded) scoring protocols (including the Borda rule and
all k-Approval rules) and the Bucklin, Simplified Bucklin, Copeland, and Maximin rules. It
turns out that for all of them—except for the Copeland rule—the problem can be solved in
polynomial time. This stands in sharp contrast to the constructive case, where the problem
is NP-hard [16] (and hard in the parameterized sense [4]) for the Borda, Copeland, and
Maximin rules (however, Shift Bribery is in P for the k-Approval family of rules and the
Simplified Bucklin and Bucklin rules [35]).
The Shift Bribery problem was introduced by Elkind et al. [16] to model (a kind
of) campaign management problem in elections. The problem is as follows: We are given
∗Early version of this paper was presented at the AAMAS 2016 conference.
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an election, that is, a set of candidates and a set of voters that rank the candidates from
the most to the least desirable one, a preferred candidate p, a budget B, and the costs
for shifting p forward in voters’ rankings. Our goal is to decide if it is possible to ensure
p’s victory by shifting p forward, without exceeding the budget. In this paper we study
the destructive variant of the problem, where the goal is to ensure that a given despised
candidate d does not win the election, by shifting him or her back in voters’ rankings (but,
again, each shift comes at a cost and we cannot exceed the given budget).
Studying destructive variants of election problems, where the goal is to change the
current winner (such as manipulation [9], control [23], and bribery [18, 25, 7, 37]), is a
common practice in computational social choice, but our setting is somewhat special. So
far, all the destructive variants of the problems were defined by changing the goal from
“ensure the victory of the preferred candidate” to “preclude the despised candidate from
winning,” but the set of available actions remained unaffected (e.g., in both the constructive
and the destructive problem of control by adding voters, we can add some voters from a
given pool of voters and in both the constructive and the destructive bribery problem, we
can pay voters to change their votes in some way). In our case, we feel that it is natural
to divert from this practice and change the ability of “shifting the distinguished candidate
forward” to the ability of “shifting the distinguished candidate back”. Below we explain
why.
If, when defining our destructive problem, we stuck with the “ability to shift forward,”
as in the Constructive Shift Bribery problem, we would get the following problem:
Ensure that a given despised candidate does not win the election by shifting him or her for-
ward in some of the votes (without exceeding the budget). However, for a monotone voting
rule, if a candidate is already winning an election, then shifting him or her forward cer-
tainly cannot preclude him or her from winning. This would make our problem interesting
only for a relatively small set of nonmonotone rules.1 Further, the problem certainly would
not be modeling what one would intuitively think of as negative, destructive campaigning.
Thus, while it certainly would be interesting to study how to exploit nonmonotonicity of
rules such as STV and Dodgson (or various multiwinner rules) to preclude someone from
winning, it would not be the most practical way of defining Destructive Shift Bribery.
1.1 Related Work
In recent years, Constructive Shift Bribery received quite some attention. The prob-
lem was defined by Elkind et al. [16], as a simplified variant of Swap Bribery (which
itself received some attention, for example, in the works of Bredereck et al. [5], Dorn and
Schlotter [13], Faliszewski et al. [19], Knop et al. [24], and papers regarding combinatorial
domains, such as those of Mattei et al. [27] and Dorn and Kru¨ger [12]; importantly, Shiryaev
1Nonetheless, there are interesting nonmonotone rules, such as the single transferable rule (STV) and the
Dodgson rule. It is also quite common for multiwinner rules to not be monotone (see the works of Elkind et
al. [15] and Faliszewski et al. [21]), so studying this variant of the Shift Bribery problem for multiwinner
voting rules may be interesting.
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et al. [36] studied a variant of Destructive Swap Bribery and we comment on their
work later). Elkind et al. [16] have shown that Constructive Shift Bribery is NP-hard
for the Borda, Copeland, and Maximin voting rules, but polynomial-time solvable for the k-
Approval family of rules. They also gave a 2-approximation algorithm for the case of Borda,
which was later generalized to the case of all scoring rules by Elkind and Faliszewski [14].
Chen et al. [4] considered parametrized complexity of Constructive Shift Bribery, and
have shown a varied set of results (in general, parametrization by the number of positions by
which the preferred candidate is shifted tends to lead to FPT algorithms, parametrization
by the number of affected voters tends to lead to hardness results, and parametrization
by the available budget gives results between these two extremes). Recently, Bredereck
et al. [6] studied the complexity of Combinatorial Shift Bribery, where a single shift
action can affect several voters at a time. Their paper is quite related to ours, because it
was the first one in which shifting a candidate backward was possible (albeit as a negative
side effect, since the authors studied the constructive setting). Very recently, Maushagen
et al. [29] studied both constructive and destructive shift bribery (using our model with
backward shifts) for the case of round-based rules such as STV (there referred as Hare),
Coombs, Baldwin, and Nanson.
Shift Bribery belongs to the family of bribery-related problems, that were first stud-
ied by Faliszewski et al. [17] (see also the work of Hazon et al. [22] for a similar problem),
and that received significant attention within computational social choice literature (see
the survey of Faliszewski and Rothe [20]). Briefly put, in the regular Bribery problem
the goal is to ensure that a given candidate is a winner of an election by modifying—in an
arbitrary way—up to k votes, where k is part of the input. Many types of bribery prob-
lems were already studied, including—in addition to Swap and Shift Bribery—Support
Bribery [35], Extension Bribery [2, 19], and others (e.g., in judgment aggregation [1],
and in the setting of voting in combinatorial domains [27, 12, 26]). However, from our point
of view the most interesting variant of the problem is Destructive Bribery, first studied
by Faliszewski et al. [18] and also, independently, by Magrino et al. [25] and Cary [7] under
the name Margin of Victory (this problem was also studied by Xia [37] and Dey and
Narahari [11]). The idea behind Margin of Victory is that it can be very helpful in val-
idating election results: If it is possible to change the election result by changing (bribing)
relatively few votes, then one may suspect that—possibly—the election was tampered with.
Bribery problems are also related to lobbying problems [8, 3, 30].
A variant of Destructive Swap Bribery was studied by Shiryaev et al. [36] in their
work on testing how robust are winners of given elections. They presented an analysis of
the case where every swap has a unit price and they showed that the problem is easy for
scoring protocols and for the Condorcet rule.2 This work is very closely related to ours,
but the definition of the problem is somewhat different (more general types of swaps but
less general price functions). Very recently Bredereck et al. [5] studied an analogous setting
2The authors’ definition of the Condorcet rule slightly differs from a standard one usually seen in the
literature. They assume that if there is no unique Condorcet winner the rule returns the whole set of
candidates instead of an empty set (well established as a return value for this case in the literature.)
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(Destructive Swap Bribery with unit prices) for the case of multiwinner voting rules.
1.2 Our Contribution.
We believe that Destructive Shift Bribery is worth studying for three main reasons.
First, it simply is a natural variant of the Constructive Shift Bribery problem and as
the constructive variant received significant attention, we feel that it is interesting to know
how the destructive variant behaves (indeed, the work of Maushagen et al. [29] is a sign
that the destructive setting also attracts attention). Second, it models natural negative
campaigning actions, aimed at decreasing the popularity of a given candidate. Third, it
serves a similar purpose as the Margin of Victory problem [25, 37]: If it is possible to
preclude a given candidate from winning through a low-cost destructive shift bribery, then
it can be taken as a signal that the election might have been tampered with, or that some
agent performed a possibly illegal form of campaigning. Below we summarize the main
contributions of this paper:
1. We define the Destructive Shift Bribery problem and justify why a definition
that diverts from the usual way of defining destructive election problems is appropriate
in this case.
2. We show that Destructive Shift Bribery is a significantly easier problem than
constructive shift bribery. To this end, we show polynomial time algorithms
for Destructive Shift Bribery for all scoring rules with unary encoded scores
(including the Borda rule and k-Approval family of rules), Simplified Bucklin, Bucklin,
and Maximin.
3. We show that in spite of our easiness results, there still are voting rules for which
the problem is computationally hard. We exemplify this by proving NP-hardness and
W[1]-hardness (for several parameters) for the case of Copelandα family of rules.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally define elections, present
the voting rules used in the paper, define our problem, and briefly review necessary notions
regarding parametrized complexity. In Section 3, we present our results, with one subsection
for each of the studied rules. We conclude in Section 4 with an overview of our work, tables
of results, and suggestions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
For each positive integer t, by [t] we mean the set {1, 2, . . . , t}. We assume that the reader
is familiar with standard notions regarding algorithms and complexity theory, as presented
in the textbook of Papadimitriou [34].
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2.1 Elections and Election Rules
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and V =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn} is a multiset of voters. Each voter is associated with his or her preference
order ≻i, that is, a strict ranking of the candidates from the best to the worst (according
to this voter). For example, we may have election E = (C, V ) with C = {c1, c2, c3} and
V = {v1, v2}, where v1 has preference order v1 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3. If c is a candidate and v is
a voter, we write posv(c) to denote the position of c in v’s ranking (e.g., in the preceding
example we would have posv1(c1) = 1). Given an election E = (C, V ) and two distinct
candidates c and c′, by NE(c, c
′) we mean the number of voters who prefer c to c′.
An election rule R is a function that given an election E = (C, V ) outputs a set W ⊆ C
of tied election winners (typically, we expect to have a single winner, but due to symmetries
in the profile it is necessary to allow for the possibility of ties). We use the unique-winner
model, that is, we require a candidate to be the only member of R(E) to be considered E’s
winner (see the works of Obraztsova et al. [32, 33] for various other tie-breaking mechanisms
and algorithmic consequences of implementing them; indeed, there are situations where the
choice of the tie-breaking rule affects the complexity of election-related problems).
We consider the following voting rules (for the description below, we consider election
E = (C, V ) with m candidates; for each rule we describe the way it computes candidates’
scores, so that the candidates with the highest score are the winners, unless explicitly stated
otherwise):
Scoring protocols. A scoring protocol is defined through vector α = (α1, . . . , αm) of
nonincreasing, nonnegative integers. The α-score of a candidate c ∈ C is defined as∑
v∈V αposv(c). The most popular scoring protocols include the family of k-Approval
rules (for each k, k-Approval scoring protocol is defined through a vector of k ones
followed by zeros) and the Borda rule, defined by vector (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 0). The
1-Approval rule is known as Plurality.
Bucklin and Simplified Bucklin. A Bucklin winning round is the smallest value ℓ such
that there is a candidate whose ℓ-Approval score is greater or equal to |V |2 + 1 (in
other words, if there is a candidate ranked among top ℓ positions by a strict majority
of the voters). All candidates whose ℓ-Approval score is at least this value are the
winners under the Simplified Buckling rule. The Bucklin score of a candidate is his
or her ℓ-Approval score, where ℓ is the Bucklin winning round of the election. The
candidates with the highest Bucklin score are the Bucklin winners (note that the set
of Bucklin winners is a subset of the set of Simplified Bucklin winners).
Copeland. Let α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, be a rational number. The Copelandα score of a candidate
c is defined as:
|{d ∈ C \ {c} : NE(c, d) > NE(d, c)}| + α|{d ∈ C \ {c} : NE(c, d) = NE(d, c)}|.
In other words, candidate c receives one point for each candidate whom he or she
defeats in their head-to-head contest (i.e., for each candidate over whom c is preferred
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by a majority of the voters) and α points for each candidate with whom c ties their
head-to-head contest.
Maximin. The Maximin score of candidate c is defined as mind∈C\{c}NE(c, d).
We write scoreE(c) to denote the score of candidate c in election E (the election rule
will always be clear from the context).
Definition 1. For election E = (C, V ), a Condorcet winner is a candidate c ∈ C who de-
feats all the other candidates in head-to-head contests. We call an election rule R Condorcet-
consistent if, for every possible election E, it selects a Condorcet winner when one exists.
Among all the rules we consider only Maximin and Copeland are Condorcet-consistent.
However, even though they both share this property, the results we obtained show that they
differ significantly when considered from our problem’s perspective.
2.2 Destructive Shift Bribery
The Destructive Shift Bribery problem for a given election ruleR is defined as follows.
We are given an election E = (C, V ), a despised candidate d ∈ C (typically, the current
election winner), a budget B (a nonnegative integer), and the prices for shifting d backward
for each of the voters (see below). The goal is to ensure that d is not the unique R-winner
of the election by shifting him or her backward in the voters’ preference orders without
exceeding the budget.
We model the “prices for shifting d backward” as destructive shift-bribery price func-
tions. Let us fix an election E = (C, V ), with C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}, V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn},
and let the despised candidate be d. Let v be some voter and let j = posv(d). Function
ρ : N→ N ∪ {+∞} is a destructive shift-bribery price function for voter v if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. ρ(0) = 0,
2. for each two i, i′, i < i′ ≤ m− j, it holds that ρ(i) ≤ ρ(i′) for i < i′ ≤ m− j, and
3. ρ(i) = +∞ for i > m− j
For each i, we interpret value ρ(i) as the price of shifting d back by i positions in v’s
preference order. Value +∞ is used for the cases where shifting d back by i positions is
impossible (due to d’s position in the vote). We assume that in each instance, the price
functions are encoded by simply listing their values for all arguments for which they are
not +∞.
For our hardness results, we focus on the case of unit price functions, where, for each
voter, shifting the despised candidate backward by i positions costs i units of the budget.
Sometimes we also consider all-or-nothing price functions, where for each voter v there is a
value cv (which can also be set to ∞) such that the cost of shifting the despised candidate
i positions backward always costs cv , irrespective of i (except for i = 0, where the cost is
zero by definition).
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Example 1. Let us consider an instance of Destructive Shift Bribery for the Borda
rule with the following election:
v1 : b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ d, v2 : d ≻ b ≻ a ≻ c, v3 : d ≻ c ≻ a ≻ b, v4 : d ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c.
We take d to be the despised candidate, and assume that we have unit price functions. In
this election, candidate d wins with 9 points, and the second-best candidate, a, has 6 points.
However, if we shifted d two positions back in v4’s preference order, then d’s score would
decrease to 7 and a’s score would increase to 7. Thus, d would no longer be the unique
winner. In consequence, for B = 2 we have a “yes”-instance of Destructive Shift
Bribery. On the other hand, shifting d back by one position only (in whichever vote)
cannot preclude d from winning. So, for B = 1 we have a “no”-instance.
2.3 Parameterized Complexity
In the theory of parameterized complexity, the goal is to study the computational difficulty
of problems with respect to both their input length, as in classic computational complexity
theory, and some additional “parameters.” For example, for Destructive Shift Bribery
problem, the parameters may be the numbers of voters or candidates in the input election,
the budget values, the maximum numbers of shifts available for a bribery etc. (we take
the parameters to be numbers). For a parameter k, we say that a problem parametrized
by k is fixed-parameter tractable (is in FPT) if there is an algorithm that solves it in time
f(k) · |I|O(1), where |I| is the length of the encoding of a given instance and f is an arbitrary
computable function (that depends on the parameter value only). Intuitively, if a problem
is in FPT for some parameter k, then we can hope that its instances where k is small can
be solved efficiently.
Parametrized complexity theory also offers a theory of intractability. In particular, it is
widely believed that if a problem is W[1]-hard with respect to some parameter k, then there
is no FPT algorithm for this problem for this parametrization. The original definition of
the class W[1] is quite involved and it is currently common to define the class by providing
one of its complete problems (Clique parametrized by the size of the clique is the most
common example) and the notion of a parametrized reduction. In our case the situation
is even simpler: All our W[1]-hardness proofs give polynomial-time many-one reductions
from well-known W[1]-hard problems and guarantee that the values of the parameters in
the reduced-to instances depend only on the values of the parameter in the reduced-from
instances (in other words, our proofs do not use full power of parametrized reductions).
We point readers interesting in more detailed treatments of parametrized complexity
theory to the textbooks of Niedermeier [31] and Cygan et al. [10].
3 Results
In this section we present our main results. We show polynomial-time algorithms for the
k-Approval family of rules, the Borda rule, all scoring protocols (provided that they are
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encoded in unary or that the destructive shift bribery price functions are encoded in unary),
the Bucklin family of rules, and the Maximin rule. For the Copelandα family of rules, we
prove NP-hardness and several results regarding its parameterized complexity.
As a warm-up, we start with an observation regarding an upper bound of the complexity
of the Destructive Shift Bribery problem.
Observation 1. The Destructive Shift Bribery problem is in NP for every voting
rule for which winner determination is in P.
Proof. Given an instance of the problem, we guess in which votes to shift the despised
candidate and by how many positions. Then we check if the cost of these shifts does not
exceed the budget and if implementing them ensures that the despised candidate is not the
unique winner of the election.
Every voting rule that we consider in this paper is polynomial-time computable and,
thus, Observation 1 guarantees that the Destructive Shift Bribery problem for each of
our rules is in NP (in particular, all our NP-hardness proofs in fact show NP-completeness).
3.1 The k-Approval Family of Rules
We start with the k-Approval family of rules. In this case, our algorithm is very simple:
If d is the despised candidate then in each vote we should either not shift d at all or shift
him or her from one of the top k positions (where each candidate receives a single point)
to the (k + 1)-st position (where he or she would receive no points), in consequence also
shifting the candidate previously at the (k + 1)-st position one place forward (to receive
a point). Choosing which action to do for each particular voter is easy via the following
greedy/brute-force algorithm (our algorithm is based on a similar idea as that of Elkind et
al. [16] for the constructive case).
Theorem 1. For each k ∈ N, the Destructive Shift Bribery problem for the k-
Approval rule is in P.
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be the input election with C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and V =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}, let d = c1 be the despised candidate, let B be the budget, and let
{ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn} be the destructive shift-bribery price functions for the voters. Our algo-
rithm works as follows.
For every candidate c ∈ C \ {d}, we test if it is possible to guarantee that the score of c
is at least as high as that of d, by spending at most B units of budget, as follows:
1. We partition the voters into three groups, Vd,c, Vd, and V
′, such that: Vd,c contains
exactly the voters that rank c on the (k + 1)-st position and that rank d above c, Vd
contains the remaining voters that rank d among top k positions, and V ′ contains the
other remaining voters.
2. We guess two numbers, a and b, such that |Vd,c| ≤ a and |Vd| ≤ b.
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3. We pick a voters from Vd,c for whom shifting d to the (k + 1)-st position is least
expensive and we pick b voters from Vd for whom shifting d to the (k+ 1)-st position
is least expensive. We shift d to the (k + 1)-st position in the chosen votes.
4. If d is not the unique winner in the resulting election and the total cost of performed
shifts is smaller than or equal to budget B, then we accept. Otherwise, we either
try a different candidate c or different values of a and b. After trying all possible
combinations, we reject.
The algorithm runs in polynomial time: It requires trying at most O(m) different can-
didates and O(n2) different values of a and b. All the other parts of the algorithm require
polynomial time (in fact, a careful implementation can achieve running time O(mn2)).
To show correctness of the algorithm we start with an observation that it is never
beneficial to shift d below position k + 1. Further, an optimal solution, after which some
candidate c has at least as high a score as d, can consist solely of actions that shift d
backward from one of the top k positions to the (k+ 1)-st one, in effect either promoting c
to the k-th position (shifts in voter group Vd,c), or promoting some other candidate (shifts
in voter group Vd). We guess how many shifts of each type to perform and execute the least
costly ones.
3.2 The Borda Rule and All Scoring Rules
Next we consider the Borda rule. We also obtain a polynomial-time algorithm, but this
time we resort to dynamic programming. After proving Theorem 2 below, we will show
that our algorithm generalizes to all scoring protocols (provided that either the scores are
encoded in unary or the price functions are encoded in unary).
Theorem 2. The Destructive Shift Bribery problem for the Borda rule is in P.
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be the input election with C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and V =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}, let d = c1 be the despised candidate, let B be the budget, and let
{ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn} be the destructive shift-bribery price functions for the voters. As in the
case of the proof of Theorem 1, we give an algorithm that first guesses some candidate
c ∈ C \ {d} and then checks if it is possible to ensure—by shifting d backward without
exceeding budget B—that c has at least as high a score as d. The algorithm performing
this test is based on dynamic programming.
We fix c to be the candidate that we want to have a score at least as high as d. Further,
for each j ∈ [n] and k ∈ [m], we set A(j, k) to be 1 if vj ranks c among first k positions
below d, and we set it to be 0 otherwise. Finally, we write s to denote the difference between
the scores of d and c, that is, s = scoreE(d) − scoreE(c) (it must be that s > 0; otherwise
we could accept immediately since d would not be the unique winner of the election).
For each j ∈ [n] and each positive integer k, we define f(j, k) to be the smallest cost for
shifting d backward in the preference orders of the voters from the set {v1, v2, . . . , vj}, so
that, if E′ is the resulting election, it holds that:
s− (scoreE′(d)− scoreE′(c)) ≥ k.
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In other words, f(j, k) is the lowest cost of shifting d backward in the preference orders of
voters from the set {v1, v2, . . . , vj} so that the relative score of c with respect to d increases
by at least k points. Our goal is to compute f(n, s); if it is at most B then it means that
we can ensure that c has at least as high a score as d by spending at most B units of the
budget. We make the following observation.
Observation 2. Shifting candidate d backward by some k positions decreases the score of
d by k points and, if d passes c, increases the score of c by one point. In effect, relative to
d, c gains, respectively, k or k + 1 points.
Now, we can express function f as follows. We have that f(0, 0) = 0 and for each
positive k we have f(k, 0) =∞ (for technical reasons, whenever k < 0, we take f(j, k) = 0).
For each j ∈ [n] and k ∈ [s], we have:
f(j, k) = min
k′≤k
f(j − 1, k − (k′ +A(j, k′)) + ρj(k
′).
To explain the formula, we observe that:
1. The minimum is taken over the value k′; k′ gives the number of positions by which
we shift d backward in vote vj.
2. When we shift d backward by k′ positions, relative to d, candidate c gains k′+A(j, k′)
points.
3. The cost of this shift is ρj(k
′).
Based on these observations, we conclude that the formula is correct. It is clear that using
this formula and standard dynamic programming techniques, we can compute f(n, s) in
polynomial time with respect to n and m. This means that we can test in polynomial time,
for a given candidate c, if it is possible to ensure that c’s score is at least as high as that
of d.
Our algorithm for Destructive Shift Bribery for Borda simply considers each can-
didate c ∈ C \ {d} and tests if, within budget B, it is possible to ensure that c has at least
as high a score as d. If this test succeeds for some c, we accept. Otherwise we reject.
A careful inspection of the above proof shows that there is not much in it that is specific
to the Borda rule (as opposed to other scoring protocols). Indeed, there are only the
following two dependencies:
1. The fact that the difference between the scores of candidate d and candidate c (value s)
can be bounded by a polynomial of the number of voters and the number of candidates
(dynamic programming requires us to store a number of values of the function f that
is proportional to s, so it is important that this value is polynomially bounded).
2. The way we compute the increase of the score of c, relative to d, in the recursive
formula for f(j, k).
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Since it is easy to modify the formula for f(j, k) to work for an arbitrary scoring proto-
col α, we have the following corollary (the assumption about unary encoding of the input
scoring protocol ensures that the first point in the above list of dependencies is not violated).
Corollary 1. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a scoring protocol α (for m can-
didates) encoded in unary and an instance I of the Destructive Shift Bribery problem
(with the same number m of candidates), tests in polynomial time if I is a “yes”-instance
for the voting rule defined by the scoring protocol α.
What can we do if, in fact, our scoring protocol is impractical to encode in unary (e.g.,
if our scoring protocol is of the form (2m−1, 2m−2, . . . , 1))? In this case, it is easy to show
the following result.
Corollary 2. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a scoring protocol α (for m
candidates) and an instance I of the Destructive Shift Bribery problem (with the same
number m of candidates), with price functions encoded in unary, tests in polynomial time
if I is a “yes”-instance for the voting rule defined by the scoring protocol α.
To prove this result, we use the same argument as before, but now function f has
slightly different arguments: f(j, t) is the maximum increase of the score of c, relative to d,
that one can achieve by spending at most t units of budget (using such “dual” formulation
is standard for bribery problems and was applied, for example, by Faliszewski et al. [17,
Theorem 3.8] in the first paper regarding the complexity of bribery problems).
On the other hand, if both the scoring protocol and the price functions are encoded in
binary, and the scoring protocol is part of the input, then the problem is NP-complete by
a reduction from the Partition problem.
Definition 2. In the Partition problem, we are given a sequence of positive integers and
we ask if it can be partitioned into two subsequences whose elements sum up to the same
value.
Theorem 3. The Destructive Shift Bribery problem is NP-complete if both the scor-
ing protocol and the price functions are encoded in binary, and the scoring protocol is part
of the input.
Proof. Consider an instance of the Partition problem with sequence S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
and let s =
∑n
i=1 si be the sum of the elements from S. Without loss of generality, we
assume that for each i ∈ [n− 1] we have si ≥ si+1. We also assume that s is even and that
s1 <
s
2 (for s1 =
s
2 an instance is polynomial-time solvable, for s1 >
s
2 we get a “no”-instance
of Partition). We form an instance of Destructive Shift Bribery as follows:
1. We introduce candidates d, p1, . . . , pn, and dummy candidates {c
j
i | i, j ∈ [n]}.
2. We form a scoring vector α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn2+n+1) such that α1 =
s
2 , for each i ∈ [n]
we have αi+1 = si, and for all i ≥ n+2 we have αi = 0. By our assumptions regarding
the sequence S, we have that α is a legal scoring vector.
11
3. Our election consists of n votes, each representing an element of S. For each element si
we construct vote vi by placing candidate pi on the first position and candidate d on
the (i+ 1)-st position. We fill the remaining n places among the top n + 2 positions
in vote vi with candidates from the set {c
j
i : j ∈ [n]} in an arbitrary way. Then we
complete vote vi by placing the remaining candidates on positions n+ 3, n+ 4, . . . in
an arbitrary order.
4. We set the budget B to be s2 . For every voter vi, we define bribery function ρi such
that ρi(0) = 0, for each t ∈ [n − i + 1] we have ρi(t) = si, and ρi(t) = B + 1 for all
other possible values of t.
We illustrate this construction in the example below.
Example 2. Consider a Partition instance with sequence S = (5, 4, 2, 2, 1). Our reduction
forms an election with candidate set C = {d} ∪ {p1, . . . , p5} ∪ {c
j
i | i, j ∈ [5]} and votes
v1, . . . , v5. The scoring protocol α is (7, 5, 4, 2, 2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and budget is B = 7. The
preference orders of the voters are:
v1 : p1 ≻ d ≻ c
1
1 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
3
1 ≻ c
4
1 ≻ c
5
1 ≻ . . .
v2 : p2 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ d ≻ c
2
2 ≻ c
3
2 ≻ c
4
2 ≻ c
5
2 ≻ . . .
v3 : p3 ≻ c
1
3 ≻ c
2
3 ≻ d ≻ c
3
3 ≻ c
4
3 ≻ c
5
3 ≻ . . .
v4 : p4 ≻ c
1
4 ≻ c
2
4 ≻ c
3
4 ≻ d ≻ c
4
4 ≻ c
5
4 ≻ . . .
v5 : p5 ≻ c
1
5 ≻ c
2
5 ≻ c
3
5 ≻ c
4
5 ≻ d ≻ c
5
5 ≻ . . .
For every voter vi, its bribery function ρi has the following values: ρi(0) = 0, ρi(t) = si for
t ∈ [6− i], and ρi(t) = 8 for all other possible values of t.
The unique winner of the election constructed by our reduction is d, with score s. For
each candidate pi, we have score(pi) =
s
2 , and for all i, j ∈ [n] we have score(c
j
i ) <
s
2 . Scores
of the pi candidates cannot change due to shifting d backward within budget, because either
they are ranked ahead of d or they are ranked too far behind d (so it is impossible to shift
d behind them within budget). Similarly, no dummy candidate can achieve a score larger
than s2 . Thus to prevent d from winning the election, one has to decrease his or her score
at least by s2 (so that the pi candidates have at least as high scores as d has).
We observe that by bribing some voter vi, we are not able to decrease candidate d’s score
by a value grater than the number of units of budget spent. Moreover, the budget is s2 ,
which is also the number of points by which d’s initial score has to be reduced. Hence, if we
choose to bribe some voter vi, then we have to shift d backward to the (n+2)-nd position,
decreasing his or her score by si points at the same time. Together, these observations
mean that in a successful bribery we have to reduce d’s score by a sum of some elements
s1, . . . , sn. Further, this sum has to equal exactly
s
2 . Therefore, there exists a solution to
the created Destructive Shift Bribery instance if and only if there exists a solution to
the initial Partition instance.
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The reduction is computable in polynomial time and (by Observation 1) the De-
structive Shift Bribery problem belongs to NP, which means that the problem is
NP-complete.
3.3 The Bucklin Family of Rules
We continue our analysis of the Destructive Shift Bribery problem by considering the
Bucklin and Simplified Bucklin rules. We find that for both rules our problem is polynomial-
time solvable (via a dynamic programming approach). Before presenting our solution, it
is helpful to define some additional notation. For election E = (C, V ), we denote the k-
Approval score of some candidate c ∈ C by scorek(c). For some fixed k, we frequently
use the term k-Approval point referring to any single point a candidate gets during the
computation of his or her k-Approval score. Consequently, for some fixed k, a candidate
may lose or gain a k-Approval point as an effect of a shift action of some voter. We use
maj(V ) =
⌊
|V |
2
⌋
+ 1 to denote the strict majority threshold for voters V .
Theorem 4. The Destructive Shift Bribery problem for the Bucklin rule is in P.
Proof. Let us fix budget B and election E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and V =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}. We also have shift-bribery prices functions {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn}. Without loss
of generality, we assume that c1 = d is the despised candidate.
To prove our theorem, we give an algorithm which first guesses candidate ci 6= d and the
Bucklin winning round k and, then, checks whether ci is able to preclude d from being the
unique winner of the election while ensuring that k is the Bucklin winning round (or the
Bucklin winning round is even earlier). We start by defining an appropriate helper function,
then we show that we can solve our problem using this function, and eventually we show
that this function is polynomial-time computable.
For each candidate ci ∈ C \ {d} and each k ∈ [m], we define the following function f
k
i .
For each w ∈ {0} ∪ [n] and each p, q, q′ ∈ [m], we let fki (w, p, q, q
′) be the lowest cost of
bribing at most first w voters so that scorek(ci) = p, score
k(d) = q, and scorek−1(d) = q′.
In other words, the function gives the cost of setting up the scores of candidate ci and d in
round k (and just before round k, for d).
To check whether there is a successful bribery (i.e., one that ensures that d is not a
unique winner of the election) of cost at most B, it suffices to check if there is candidate ci,
ci 6= d, round number k ∈ [m], and values p, q, q
′ such that:
1. q′ < maj(V ),
2. p ≥ maj(V ),
3. p ≥ q, and
fki (n, p, q, q
′) ≤ B. Condition (1) guarantees that d does not win in any round prior to k,
Condition (2) ensures that k is the largest possible Bucklin winning round, and Condition (3)
imposes that d is not a unique winner if k is the Bucklin winning round (note that the actual
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winning round number might be smaller than k but then d certainly does not win). If such
a set of values exists, then we accept. Otherwise we reject.
The above algorithm requires computing O(n3) values of at most O(m2) functions fki .
Thus, to show that the algorithm runs in polynomial time, it suffices to show that the values
of the fki functions are polynomial-time computable, which we now do.
We compute values fki (n, p, q, q
′) using dynamic programming. For each p, q, q′ ∈ [n],
fki (0, p, q, q
′) = 0 if prior to any bribery we have scorek(ci) = p, score
k(d) = q, and
scorek−1(d) = q′. Otherwise, we have fki (0, p, q, q
′) = ∞. To compute fki (w, p, q, q
′) for
w > 0, we express it using a recursive formula. To present this formula compactly, for each
voter vw and each k, 1 ≤ k < m, we define:
1. Function Lkw such that for each j ∈ {0} ∪ [m] we have L
k
w(j) = 1 if candidate d is
ranked below the k-th position after he or she is shifted backward by j positions, and
we have Lkw(j) = 0 otherwise.
2. Function Gkw such that for each i, j ∈ [m], we have G
k
w(i, j) = 1 if after shifting
candidate d backward by j positions, candidate ci is ranked among top k positions,
and we have Gkw(i, j) = 0 otherwise.
Using this notation, we express function fki as follows:
fki (w, p, q, q
′) = min
j∈{0}∪[k]
{fki (w − 1, p −G
k
w(i, j), q − L
k
w(i, j), r − L
k−1
w (j)) + ρw(j)}
Intuitively, for given k and i, the above formula checks all possible values of j,3 for which
we shift d backward by j positions in vote vw, and uses shifts in the preceding votes to fulfill
the function’s definition. This formula, together with standard dynamic programming tech-
niques, allows us to compute the values of function fki in polynomial time. This completes
the proof.
By slightly changing the function presented in the above proof and using a similar
algorithm, we obtain an algorithm for the Simplified Bucklin rule.
Theorem 5. The Destructive Shift Bribery problem for the Simplified Bucklin rule
is in P.
Proof. We adjust the proof of Theorem 4 to match the case of the Simplified Bucklin
rule. For this rule, the exact score of a candidate in the Bucklin winning round is not
taken into account while determining the winners (provided that it is greater than the
majority of the voters). Therefore, we can simplify function fki (w, p, q, q
′) from the proof of
Theorem 4 by removing parameter q. Consequently, we remove the constraint associated
with parameter q while checking for a successful bribery. The rest of the proof remains the
same, so Destructive Shift Bribery for the Simplified Bucklin rule is in P as well.
3For function fki it is never necessary to shift d to position lower than k + 1, which is why we consider
j ∈ {0} ∪ [k].
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3.4 The Copeland Rule
Let us now move on to the case of Copelandα family of rules. We show that irrespective
of the choice of α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the Destructive Shift Bribery problem is NP-complete
for Copelandα. We also show W[1]-hardness of the problem for parametrizations by the
budget, the number of voters, and the number of bribed voters. On the other hand, an
FPT algorithm for the parametrization by the number of candidates was given by Knop et
al. [24] (formally, they did not study Destructive Shift Bribery, but it is immediate
to see that their proof extends to this setting). To show our hardness results, we use
reductions from one of the classic NP-complete problems, Clique (which is also W[1]-hard
for the parameterization by the clique size).
Definition 3. In the Clique problem we are given a graph and an integer k. We ask
whether it is possible to find a k-clique, that is, a size-k set of pairwise adjacent vertices, in
the given graph.
We use the following notation in the proofs in this section. By putting some set S in
a preference order, we mean listing the contents of the set in an arbitrary but fixed order.
To denote the reversed order we use
←−
S (e.g., for set S = {a, b, c}, writing S in a preference
order could mean b ≻ c ≻ a; then, putting
←−
S in a preference order would mean a ≻ c ≻ b).
Theorem 6. For each (rational) value of α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the Destructive Shift Bribery
problem for the Copelandα rule is NP-complete and W[1]-hard for the parameterization by
the budget value and for the parameterization by the number of affected of voters.
Proof. Since winner determination for Copelandα is in P, by Observation 1 we see that
our problem is in NP and it remains to show its NP-hardness. We give a reduction from
Clique.
Let us fix some arbitrary value of α and an instance of Clique with a given graph
G = (V (G), E(G)) and an integer k. We construct an instance of Destructive Shift
Bribery with an election E = (C, V ), unit bribery prices and budget B = 3
(
k
2
)
. Let the
set of candidates C be {d, p} ∪L ∪L′ ∪ V (G) ∪E(G) ∪ S (members of V (G) and E(G) are
both vertices and edges in G and corresponding candidates in our election). Sets L, L′, and
S contain dummy candidates, where L and L′ consist of |V | · |E| · B candidates each, and
S consists of
(
k
2
)
+ k + 1 candidates. We introduce the following voters:
1. For each edge {u, v} = e ∈ E¯, we introduce two voters with the following preference
orders:
1 vote : d ≻ u ≻ v ≻ e ≻ L ≻ L′ ≻ p ≻ E(G) \ {e} ≻ V (G) \ {u, v} ≻ S
1 vote :
←−
S ≻
←−−−−−−−−−
V (G) \ {u, v} ≻
←−−−−−−−
E(G) \ {e} ≻ p ≻
←−
L′ ≻
←−
L ≻ e ≻ v ≻ u ≻ d.
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candidate(s) score
d |V |+ |E|+ |L|+ |L′|+ |S|
p |V |+ |E|+ |L|+ |L′|+ 1
S ≤ |V |+ |E|+ |L′|+ |S|
L ≤ |V |+ |E|+ |L|+ |S| − 1
L′ ≤ |V |+ |E|+ |L|+ |L′| − 1
V ≤ |E|+ |V | − 1
E ≤ |E| − 1
Table 1: Scores of all the candidates in the constructed election. We indicate upper bounds
by ≤ where scores relate to groups of candidates.
2. We introduce 2k − 3 voters with the following preference orders:
k − 2 votes : E(G) ≻ d ≻ L ≻ S ≻ p ≻ L′ ≻ V (G),
k − 2 votes : p ≻ L′ ≻ d ≻ L ≻ V (G) ≻ S ≻ E(G),
1 vote : S ≻ p ≻ d ≻ L′ ≻ V (G) ≻ L ≻ E(G).
3. We introduce 6k2 voters with the following preference orders:
3k2 votes : d ≻ L ≻ L′ ≻ C \ ({d} ∪ L ∪ L′),
3k2 votes :
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C \ ({d} ∪ L ∪ L′) ≻ d ≻ L′ ≻ L.
Note that the number of voters is odd, so the value of α is irrelevant.
We present the scores of the candidates, prior to bribery, in Table 1 (for some candidates
we only provide upper bounds on their scores; to verify the values in the table, it is helpful
to note that the preference orders of the pairs of voters in the first group are reverses of each
other, and thus one can disregard them when calculating scores). We see that candidate d
is the winner.
By shifting d backward without exceeding the budget, we can only change the outcome
of head-to-head contests between d and the candidates from V (G) and E(G). All the other
candidates are either ranked too far away from d or, as in the case for L and L′, d has too
large advantage over them. For each candidate v ∈ V (G), we have NE(d, v) −NE(v, d) =
2k − 3, and for each e ∈ E(G), we have NE(d, e) − NE(e, d) = 1. Thus, for d to lose a
head-to-head contest against a candidate v ∈ V (G), d has to be shifted behind v in at least
k − 1 votes, and to lose a head-to-head contest against a candidate e ∈ E(G), d has to be
shifted behind e in at least one vote (note that the scores of candidates in V (G) and E(G)
are so low that after a shift bribery that does not exceed the budget, neither of them can
be a winner).
Candidate p has the second highest score in our election and we have scoreE(d) −
scoreE(p) =
(
k
2
)
+ k. Hence, to prevent d from being a winner, we need to lower d’s
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score by at least
(
k
2
)
+ k. If our graph contains a clique of size k that consists of edges
Q = {e1, . . . , e(k
2
)}, then for each voter from the first group that corresponds to one of these
edges we shift d backward by three positions. This costs 3
(
k
2
)
units of budget. Candidate d
loses one point for each edge from the clique and one point for each vertex from the clique
(because d passes each of them exactly k− 1 times). Altogether, d loses
(
k
2
)
+ k points and
ceases to be the unique winner.
For the other direction, assume that there is a shift bribery of cost at most B = 3
(
k
2
)
that
ensures that d is not the unique winner. By the observations from the previous paragraphs,
we can assume that the bribery affects voters in the first group only (and for each pair of
voters there, it affects the first one). We claim that the bribery has to shift d behind
(
k
2
)
edge candidates in the first group of voters. To see why this is the case, assume that it
shifts d behind y =
(
k
2
)
− x (distinct) edge candidates, where x is a positive integer smaller
or equal to
(
k
2
)
. To make d lose
(
k
2
)
+ k points, we need to shift d backwards behind at least(
k
2
)
+ k − y = k+ x vertex candidates at least k− 1 times. That means that altogether the
number of unit shifts that we need to make is at least:
3
((
k
2
)
− x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
passing edge candidates
+ (k + x)(k − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total number of unit shifts
needed to pass vertex candidates
− 2
((
k
2
)
− x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unit shifts for passing vertex candidates,
accounted for while passing edge candidates
.
This value is equal to:
(
k
2
)
− x+ (k + x)(k − 1) =
(
k
2
)
− x+ k(k − 1) + x(k − 1)
= 3
(
k
2
)
− x+ x(k − 1) = 3
(
k
2
)
+ x(k − 2),
which is greater than B = 3
(
k
2
)
for k > 2 and x > 1. Since we can assume that k > 2
without loss of generality, we see that a successful shift bribery that does not exceed the
budget has to guarantee that d passes exactly
(
k
2
)
edge candidates. One can verify that this
leads to d passing k vertex candidates k − 1 times each only if these edges form a size-k
clique.
Clique is W[1]-hard for the parameter k. As our budget is a function of k and the
number of affected voters is exactly
(
k
2
)
, our reduction shows W[1]-hardness with respect to
the budget and with respect to the number of affected voters.
The problem remains hard also for the parametrization by the number of voters.
Theorem 7. Parameterized by the number of voters, the Destructive Shift Bribery
problem is W[1]-hard, even for the case of unit prices.
Proof. We give a parameterized reduction from the Multicolored Independent Set
problem, where we are given a graph G = (V (G), E(G)) with each vertex colored with one
out of h colors, and we ask if there is a size-h subset of vertices I ⊆ V (G) such that every
vertex has a different color and for each two u, v ∈ I, there is no edge {u, v} in the graph.
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We assume without loss of generality that the number of vertices of every color is the same,
there are no edges between vertices of the same color, and there exists at least one vertex
with non-zero degree among vertices of each color. Let q be the number of vertices of each
color. We denote the maximum degree among vertices of graph G by ∆. Let δ(v) be the
degree of vertex v ∈ V (G), and let E(v) be the set of edges adjacent to a given vertex
v ∈ V (G). By V (i) we mean the set of all vertices of color i.
For each color i, we introduce vertex candidates V (i) = {vi1, v
i
2, . . . , v
i
q}. We represent
every edge in the input graph G with one edge candidate. For each vertex candidate vij, by
Eij we denote the set of edge candidates representing the edges incident to v
i
j in graph G.
We write Gc to denote the set of all vertex and edge candidates. If for some i ∈ [h] and
j ∈ [q], |Eij | < ∆, we add the set of filler candidates F
i
j of size ∆ − δ(v
i
j). We write F to
denote the union of all the sets of filler candidates for all the vertices. We introduce h+ 3
sets of dummy candidates with t = hq(∆+1) elements each (note that t > |V (G)|+|E(G)|);
namely, these sets are D1, . . . ,Dh, D
′, D′′, and D′′′. We write D to denote
⋃h
i=1Di and
D−i to denote D\Di. Lastly, we add candidates d, p and q. To specify voters in a compact
form, for every color i ∈ [h] we introduce partial preference order:
Pi = v
i
1 ≻ E
i
1 ≻ F
i
1 ≻ v
i
2 ≻ · · · ≻ v
i
3 ≻ · · · ≻ v
i
q ≻ E
i
q ≻ F
i
q .
For a given i ∈ [h], we write P−i to denote an arbitrary but fixed order over all the vertex,
edge and filler candidates not ranked in Pi. The constructed election consists of the following
votes:
1. For each color i we construct votes:
oi : d ≻ Pi ≻ Di ≻ D−i ≻ P−i ≻ p ≻ q ≻ D
′ ≻ D′′ ≻ D′′′,
o′i : d ≻
←−
Pi ≻
←−
Di ≻ D−i ≻ P−i ≻ p ≻ q ≻ D
′ ≻ D′′ ≻ D′′′.
We add votes o¯i and o¯
′
i with the reversed preference order of, respectively, oi and o
′
i.
2. We introduce seven votes as follows:
u1 : p ≻ F ≻ D ≻ q ≻ D
′ ≻
←−
D′′ ≻ Gc ≻ D
′′′ ≻ d,
u2 : d ≻
←−
D′′ ≻
←−
Gc ≻ D
′′′ ≻
←−
D′ ≻ D ≻ q ≻ p ≻ F,
u3 : p ≻ q ≻ d ≻
←−
D′ ≻ D′′′ ≻ D ≻ F ≻ D′′ ≻ Gc,
u4 : Gc ≻ d ≻ D
′′ ≻ F ≻ D ≻ p ≻ q ≻ D′′′ ≻ D′,
u5 : d ≻ D
′′′ ≻ F ≻ Gc ≻ D
′′ ≻ D ≻ p ≻ q ≻ D′,
u6 : q ≻ p ≻ D ≻ D
′′ ≻ d ≻
←−
D′′′ ≻ D′ ≻ F ≻ Gc,
u7 : q ≻ D
′ ≻ Gc ≻ d ≻ p ≻ F ≻ D ≻ D
′′ ≻ D′′′.
Our election admits unit prices, and the budget is B = h(q + (q − 1)∆).
18
candidate score
d (h+ 3)t+ |E|+ |V |+ |F |+ 1
p (h+ 3)t+ |F |+ 1
q 3t+ |F |+ |E|+ |V |+ 1
Di, i ∈ [h] ≤ (h+ 3)t
D′ ≤ t+ |F | − 1
D′′ ≤ 3t+ |E| + |V | − 1
D′′′ ≤ 2t+ |F | − 1
V , E ≤ (h+ 2)t+ |E|+ |V |
F ≤ (h+ 1)t+ |E|+ |V |+ |F | − 1
Table 2: The scores of all of the candidates in the constructed election. We indicate upper
bounds by ≤ where scores relate to groups of candidates.
F V E D D′ D′′ D′′′
d 5 1 1 3 5 3 7
Table 3: For each set X ∈ {F, V.E.D,D′,D′′,D′′′} and each c ∈ X, we report the difference
between the number of voters that prefer d to c and those that prefer c to d.
We show the scores of the candidates (prior to bribery) in Table 2. For example,
candidate d wins head-to-head contests with all the candidates in D′, D′′, D′′, and D,
which accounts for the first (h+3)t points. Candidate d also wins with all the edge, vertex,
and filler candidates, which gives additional |E| + |V | + |F | points. Finally, d wins with p
but not with q.
Note that the budget value is smaller than the number of dummy candidates in each of
the sets D1, . . . ,Dh,D
′,D′′, and D′′′ (i.e., B < t). Moreover, in each vote in which d can
be shifted back, d is either directly preferred to some set of dummy candidates or there are
candidates from sets F , E and V between d and some set of dummy candidates. These two
observations imply that, with a shift bribery of cost at most B, candidate d can be shifted
back only behind candidates from sets F , V , E, D′, D′′, D′′′, and
⋃
i∈[q]Di. In Table 3
we present differences between the numbers of voters preferring d to the candidates from
these sets and the voters with the opposite preferences. Let us fix some candidate c ∈
D′∪D′′∪D′′′∪
⋃
i∈[q]Di. We note that there is no bribery of cost at most B which makes d
lose a head-to-head contest with c. If it were possible, then at least two voters would have
to shift d behind c. However, with a bribery of cost at most B, d can pass candidate c at
most once. This is a consequence of the fact that every time we shift d behind c in some
vote, there exists only one other vote v in which we can do this once more within cost B;
however, the cost of such a shift in v is always greater that the remaining budget. Let us
now consider some candidate c ∈ F . For d to lose the head-to-head contest against c, d has
to be shifted behind c in at least three votes. However, there exist only two votes in which
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the price of a backward shift of d behind c is within the budget (e.g., for c ∈ F ij , i ∈ [h],
j ∈ [q], the votes are oi and o
′
i).
The final conclusion from our observations is that to prevent d from being a unique
winner of the election, with a shift bribery of cost at most B, one has to shift candidate d
behind every edge and vertex candidate at least once. Then candidate d would no longer be
the unique winner because d and p would tie (note that as t > |E|+ |V |, no other candidate
could threaten d). We claim that if one is able to shift d back behind every edge and
vertex candidate at least once without exceeding the budget, then the input graph G has a
multicolored independent set of size h. To show this, let us focus on some color i. Due to
the budget constraint and votes’ construction, we have to shift d back behind every vertex
v ∈ V (i) bribing only voters oi and o
′
i. To achieve this, we have to spend at least q+(q−1)∆
units of budget. We observe that it is also the upper bound because our argument holds for
every color and we are constrained by the budget B = h(q + (q − 1)∆). However, spending
q+(q−1)∆ units of budget for some color i does not allow us to shift d back behind all the
candidates in
⋃
j∈[q]E
i
j. We have to shift d back behind all vertex candidates of color i and
the only possibility to achieve this is to leave all candidate edges of one vertex candidate not
passed by d. Let us call this vertex a selected vertex. Now, we can see that the only case
where all edge candidates are, nonetheless, passed by candidate d is if the selected vertex
candidates form a multicolored independent set. If this is not the case, than there exists at
least one edge e connecting two selected vertices. Since edge candidates of selected vertices
are not passed by d, the edge candidate corresponding to e is never passed by d and, so,
d is still the unique winner. On the other hand, one can also verify that if there exists a
multicolored independent set, then one can always find a successful bribery.
Since our reduction is a valid parameterized (indeed, a polynomial-time computable one)
reduction where the number of voters is a function of the parameter h, and Multicolored
Independent Set is W[1]-hard for this parameter, we conclude that our problem is W[1]-
hard for the parameterization by the number of the voters.
For the sake of completeness, we finish our analysis by mentioning one more param-
eterized computational complexity result regarding Destructive Shift Bribery for
Copelandα.
Observation 3. Parameterized by the combined parameter number of voters and bud-
get value, the Destructive Shift Bribery problem is in FPT. Destructive Shift
Bribery is in FPT with respect to the parameter number of voters for all-or-nothing bribery
functions (where, for each voter, there is a single price for every possible shift).
Proof. For unconstrained bribery functions one can guess which voters to bribe and how
many budget units to use for each bribed voter. The result holds for all-or-nothing prices
functions because it suffices to guess the voters where we shift d to the back.
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3.5 The Maximin Rule
In spite of the hardness results from the previous section, it certainly is not the case that
Destructive Shift Bribery is hard for all Condorcet-consistent rules. We now show a
polynomial time algorithm for the case of Maximin.
Theorem 8. The Destructive Shift Bribery problem for the Maximin rule is in P.
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be the input election with C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and V =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}, let d ∈ C be the despised candidate, let B be the budget, and let
{ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn} be the destructive shift-bribery price functions for the voters. A solution
to Destructive Shift Bribery is a vector S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) of n integers such that
candidate d does not win in the election resulting from bribing each voter vi ∈ V to shift
d back by si positions. Naturally, S is a solution if the price of all shifts it describes
does not exceed the budget. Fix some solution S and the resulting election E′ = (C, V ′),
where V ′ = {v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
n}. In election E
′ there are always two important candidates:
candidate w, whose score is at least as high as that of d in E′, and candidate t such that
scoreE′(d) = NE′(d, t). Intuitively, w is the candidate that ensures that d is not a unique
winner, and t is the candidate that “implements” the score of d in election E′. Note that
it is possible that w = t. We call a solution S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) tight if for every voter v
′
i
such that si 6= 0, it holds that either v
′
i ranks d just below w or v
′
i ranks d just below t.
Intuitively, the solution is tight if we do not waste the budget to make unnecessary shifts
that do not affect the relative order of d, w and t. Note that we are able to modify any
solution S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) so that it becomes tight, by undoing, for every voter, as many
shifts as possible without changing the relative positions of d, w, and t. S′ is a solution
because d, w, and t have the same scores after applying S′ as after applying S. More so,
the cost of S′ is at most as high as that of S. Thus it suffices to focus on tight solutions.
Our algorithm tries each pair of t and w and checks if there is a tight solution for them
with cost at most B. It accepts if so, and it rejects if there is no solution with cost at most
B for any choice of t and w. Since there are at most O(m2) pairs of candidates to try, it
suffices to show a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the cheapest tight solution for
given t and w. Below we focus on the case where t 6= w; the case where t = w is analogous.
Let us fix candidates t and w, t 6= w. For each two candidates c1, c2, we write pref(c1, c2)
to denote the set of voters (from V ) that prefer c1 over c2. Let price(v, c) be the cost
of shifting candidate d just below c in v’s preference order. Since we are interested in
changing the relative positions of candidates t, w and d, we focus on voters in the set
pref(d,w) ∪ pref(d, t) = {v′′1 , v
′′
2 , · · · , v
′′
ℓ } (i.e., voters who prefer d to at least one of w
and t). We define function fw,t such that fw,t(j, x, y) is the lowest cost for shifting d
backward in the preference orders of the voters from {v′′1 , v
′′
2 , . . . , v
′′
j } in a way that ensures
that d moves x times below w and y times below t (observe that j, x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ}).
With function fw,t, we can compute the cost of the cheapest tight solution for candidates
w and t. It suffices to try all values of fw,t(ℓ, x, y) for pairs x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ}. For each pair
it is easy to compute the scores that candidates d and w get after shifting d back x times
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behind w and y times behind t. If w has at least as high score as d and the cost is at most
B, then we accept.
We give a recursive formula for function fw,t that allows to compute the function’s
values in polynomial-time, by using standard dynamic programming techniques. For each
j, x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ}, we have fw,t(j, 0, 0) = 0. If x > 0 or y > 0, then fw,t(0, x, y) = ∞
to indicate the impossibility of making shifts with no budget.4 For other values of the
arguments, a more involved discussion is necessary. Let us fix some values of j ∈ [ℓ], and
x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ}. There are three cases to consider:
Case 1: If v′′j ∈ pref(d,w) \ pref(d, t), that is, if v
′′
j prefers d to w, but not to t, then we
have:
fw,t(j, x, y) = min
{
fw,t(j − 1, x, y),
fw,t(j − 1, x− 1, y) + price(v
′′
j , w)
}
.
To see the correctness of the formula, note that to achieve the fact that d moves x times
behind w and y times below t for the voters v′′1 , v
′′
2 , . . . , v
′′
j , we either ensure that this
happens already for the voters v′′1 , v
′′
2 , . . . , v
′′
j−1 and leave v
′′
j intact, or we ensure that
d moves x− 1 times below w and y times below t for voters v′′1 , v
′′
2 , . . . , v
′′
j−1 and shift d
back behind w in v′′j ’s preference order (we omit such detailed descriptions below, but the
general idea for each of the cases is the same).
Case 2: If v′′j is in pref(d, t) \ pref(d,w), then we have:
fw,t(j, x, y) = min
{
fw,t(j − 1, x, y),
fw,t(j − 1, x, y − 1) + price(v
′′
j , t)
}
.
Case 3: If v′′j is in pref(d,w) ∩ pref(d, t) and v
′′
j prefers d to w and w to t, then we have:
fw,t(j, x, y) = min


fw,t(j − 1, x, y),
fw,t(j − 1, x− 1, y) + price(v
′′
j , w),
fw,t(j − 1, x− 1, y − 1) + price(v
′′
j , t)

 .
On the other hand, if v′′j prefers d to t and t to w then we have:
fw,t(j, x, y) = min


fw,t(j − 1, x, y),
fw,t(j − 1, x, y − 1) + price(v
′′
j , t),
fw,t(j − 1, x− 1, y − 1) + price(v
′′
j , w)

 .
Given this discussion, using standard dynamic-programming approach it is possible to
compute the values of functions fw,t in polynomial time. For the case of w = t, one has to
slightly adapt all possible cases when computing function fw,t.
4If the bribery price functions allow for shifting d back at zero cost in some votes, we shift d as much as
possible at zero cost as a preprocessing step.
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Constructive Destructive
Election rule Shift Bribery Shift Bribery
Plurality P P
k-Approval P P
Borda NP-com. P
Maximin NP-com. P
Copelandα NP-com. NP-com.
Table 4: The complexity of Shift Bribery for various election rules. The results for the
constructive case are due to Elkind et al. [16] and the results regarding the destructive case
are due to this paper.
It is interesting to ask what feature of the Maximin rule—as opposed to the Copeland
rule—leads to the fact that Destructive Shift Bribery is polynomial-time solvable.
We believe that the reason is that it is safe to focus on a small number of candidates (the
candidates w and t). For Copeland elections, on the other hand, one has to keep track
of all the candidates that the despised candidate passes, because each such pass could,
in effect, decrease the despised candidate’s score. (Interestingly, the same is true for the
Borda rule—each time the despised candidate passes a candidate, the despised candidate’s
score decreases. However, in the case of Borda this process is unconditional, whereas in the
case of Copeland’s rule, the decrease may or may not happen, depending on shifts in other
preference orders).
4 Conclusions
We have introduced and studied a destructive variant of the Shift Bribery problem. In
our problem, we ask if it is possible to preclude a given candidate from being the winner of
an election by shifting this candidate backward in some of the votes (at a given cost, within
a given budget), whereas in the constructive variant of the problem one asks if it is possible
to ensure a given candidate’s victory by shifting him or her forward.
We have shown that Destructive Shift Bribery is polynomial-time solvable for
the k-Approval family of rules (in effect, including the Plurality rule), the Borda rule, all
scoring protocols (as long as either the protocol or the price functions can be assumed to
be encoded in unary) the Simplified Bucklin rule, the Bucklin rule, and the Maximin rule.
On the other hand, we have shown that for each rational value of α, the problem is NP-
complete for Copelandα. We have investigated the problem’s parameterized complexity in
this case showing that it remains hard for the case of small budgets and for the case of few
voters, even under unit price functions. However, the problem is in FPT for the case of
few candidates [24]. We summarize our results on general complexity in Table 4, whereas
Table 5 contains the parameterized complexity results for Copelandα.
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Constructive Destructive
Parameterization Shift Bribery Shift Bribery
#voters W[1]-h♠ W[1]-h
#voters + budget FPT
#voters (all-or-nothing) FPT♠ FPT
#candidates FPT FPT
budget W[2]-h♠ W[1]-h
#affected voters W[2]-h♠ W[1]-h
Table 5: The complexity of Shift Bribery for Copelandα. The results marked with  are
due to Knop et al. [24] and the resuts marked with ♠ follow from the work of Bredereck et
al. [4]. The results regarding the destructive cases are due to this paper. The empty cell
indicates that we are not aware of any work on this particular variant.
Our work leads to several open questions. First, one could always study more election
rules. Second, one can analyze the robustness of various election rules based on the number
of backward shifts of the winner needed to change their outcome [36, 5]. This direction
can also be seen as studying a more fine-grained extension of the Margin of Victory
problem. Third, it would be interesting to perform an empirical test to measure how much
we need to shift back the election winner to change the result under various assumptions
regarding the voters’ preference orders (and in real-life elections, such as those collected in
PrefLib [28]) to complement the theoretical analysis mentioned in the second idea.
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